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The Japanese economy has recently been faced with massive 
nonperforming assets and a large output gap. Thanks to the 
historically unprecedented accommodative monetary policy of the
Bank of Japan (BOJ), prices have generally been stable and severe
deflation has been avoided. Despite this, the BOJ has been 
questioned and criticized regarding its conduct of monetary policy.
For example, why doesn’t it adopt inflation targeting? Why has 
the BOJ stubbornly refused to increase the outright purchase of 
long-term government bonds? Why does the BOJ implement fund
absorption operations in the middle of monetary easing? This paper
tries to evaluate questions and criticisms regarding the conduct of the
BOJ’s monetary policy under zero inflation by using the following
two criteria: (1) the BOJ will take measures necessary to achieve the
sound development of the national economy through the pursuit of
price stability in the long run; however, (2) the BOJ will not take
such measures if the side effects are deemed greater than the effects,
which makes it difficult to achieve the objective in (1).
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Liquidity trapI. Introduction
A. Questions Regarding the Conduct of Monetary Policy
The Japanese economy has recently been faced with massive nonperforming assets
and a large output gap. The experience of the U.S. during the Great Depression has
made not a few suggest that the Bank of Japan (BOJ) should have done more in
terms of monetary policy given the extremely difficult situation.
However, in Japan, both the consumer price index (CPI) and the GDP deflator
have so far been stable, and we have managed to avoid a rapid price decline 
(deflation) as was experienced in the U.S. during the Great Depression (Figure 1).
Specifically comparing interest rates and money supply between the two countries,
under the BOJ’s historically unprecedented accommodative monetary policy, interest
rates in Japan have recently declined more rapidly and to a lower level than in the
U.S. during the Great Depression (Figure 2). Hence, it cannot be denied that such a
policy has prevented monetary contraction and deflation (Figure 3).
Despite this, the BOJ has been questioned and criticized regarding its conduct of
monetary policy. While some of the questions and criticisms are not necessarily based
on a full understanding of the extent of monetary easing as described above, others
may contain several points worth examining such as the following:
(1) Given that the BOJ aims at achieving a situation which is neither infla-
tionary nor deflationary, why does it not adopt inflation targeting as a
policy framework?
(2) Is it not the case that the BOJ is concerned more about inflation in the
remote future than deflationary risk at present?
(3) To reduce deflationary risk and achieve price stability, isn’t it necessary to
effect quantitative monetary expansion? If so, why has the BOJ stubbornly
refused to increase the outright purchase of long-term government bonds?
(4) Since the BOJ is implementing a zero interest rate policy, why doesn’t it
effect quantitative monetary expansion by suspending fund absorption
operations?
The BOJ has responded to such questions and criticisms. However, since they
intertwine with each other and involve technical points, it is not easy to deduce the
BOJ’s basic thinking from summing up the respective responses. As a result, dissatis-
faction seems to prevail among the public that the BOJ’s thinking is not necessarily
understandable in a consistent manner. Some may go even further to attribute 
the prolonged stagnation of the economy to the BOJ’s unwillingness to take
what they consider to be necessary measures. Despite the fact that to date the 
BOJ has been successful in avoiding severe deflation by implementing an unprece-
dented accommodative policy, it appears not yet to have been given the confidence 
it deserves.
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Notes: 1. Japanese price level data: 1991/I–1999/I. U.S. price level data: 1929/I–1937/IV.
            2. The horizontal scale is graduated for the Japanese case, while in the case of  
               the U.S. 1991/I corresponds to 1929/I.
            3. Japanese CPI data are adjusted by excluding the effects of the consumption 
                 tax hike in April 1997 on the assumption that prices of all taxable goods fully 
                reflect the rise in the tax rate.
Sources: Management and Coordination Agency, Consumer Price Index;
                 Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts;
                 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index;
                 Balke, N. S., and R. J. Gordon, “Historical Data,” in R. J. Gordon, ed. The 
               American   Business Cycle (University of Chicago Press, 1986).
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Figure 1  Comparison of Price Level (Between the 1990s in Japan and the Period 
of the Great Depression in the United States)
Based on such an observation, it is deemed necessary that the BOJ explain in
detail the pros and cons of various policy measures in an easy-to-follow framework.
Since Monetary Policy Meeting decisions are by majority vote, it is not necessarily
automatically guaranteed that they exhibit the same kind of consistency as is
observed in the decision making of an individual.
1 In this paper, I will discuss 
the BOJ’s conduct of monetary policy from my own viewpoint, not that of the 
“collective will of the BOJ.” 
1. In retrospect, as a result of thorough discussions at each Monetary Policy Meeting to reach a decision, it is true
that one can trace a certain continuity with respect to fundamental decisions, which can be termed the “collective
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Figure 2  Comparison of Interest Rates (Between the 1990s in Japan and the Period 
                of the Great Depression in the United States)
Yield on U.S. Treasury bonds 
(10-year; 1929/I–1937/IV)
[1] Long-Term Rates
Notes: 1. Japanese interest rates: 1991/I–1999/II. U.S. interest rates: 1929/I–1937/IV.
            2. The horizontal scale is graduated for the Japanese case, while in the case of the U.S. 1991/I 
               corresponds to 1929/I.
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly;
               Balke, N. S., and R. J. Gordon, “Historical Data,” in R. J. Gordon, ed. The American Business 
               Cycle (University of Chicago Press, 1986);
               Federal Reserve Board, Financial and Business Statistics.
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0B. Framework for Discussion
1. A monetarist’s prescription
What would be a natural framework for examining the conduct of monetary policy
in an economy experiencing deflationary pressures? Generally speaking, the natural
choice would be that of a monetarist who would immediately come up with the 
following policy prescription: under deflationary pressures, money supply needs
to be increased in the interest of price stability, and for that purpose ample
reserves should be provided. When there are serious worries over deflation, this
simple prescription would most likely win the support of most macroeconomists.
If I were a researcher studying outside a central bank, I would have also 
subscribed to the monetarist’s prescription. However, as a central banker and one
who monitors policy operations from the inside, I am not fully convinced that such a
prescription would automatically solve the problem.
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Figure 3  Comparison of Money Stock (Between the 1990s in Japan and the Period 
                of the Great Depression in the United States)
Notes: 1. Japanese money stock data: 1991/I–1999/I. U.S. money stock data: 1929/I–1937/IV.
            2. The horizontal scale is graduated for the Japanese case, while in the case of the 
               U.S. 1991/I corresponds to 1929/I.
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly;
               Balke, N. S., and R. J. Gordon, “Historical Data,” in R. J. Gordon, ed. The American 
               Business Cycle (University of Chicago Press, 1986).
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60As a result of the BOJ’s accommodative monetary easing, money supply growth
exceeds nominal GDP growth (Figure 4). The ratio of money supply growth to 
nominal GDP growth, Marshallian k (an inverse of the velocity of money), has been
increasing rapidly, thus preventing the general price level and stock prices from
falling (Figure 5).
However, despite the unprecedented accommodative monetary policy, it is true
that various indicators regarding the growth of monetary aggregates have been 
considerably lower than past averages (Table 1). Such a contrast seems to imply 
that factors other than short-term interest rates and reserves, both of which are 
controllable by a central bank, have contained the growth of monetary aggregates. 
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Figure 4  Monetary Aggregates and Nominal GDP
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly;
               Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.
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Table 1  Average Annual Growth Rate of Monetary Aggregates
Percent
Monetary base M2+CDs Broadly-defined liquidity
1970s 15.2 16.4 N.A.
1980s 7.9 9.1 9.9
1990s 5.5 3.6 4.3
1970–98 (CY)  9.5 9.8 7.1
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
M2+CDs
Broadly-defined liquidity
Figure 5  Ratio of Money Stock to Nominal GDP
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly;
               Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.
Percent
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2. For example, see Shiratsuka (1999).
2. Framework of a central bank
In evaluating the validity of policy options under such circumstances, this paper uses
the following two criteria:
(1) The BOJ will take measures necessary to achieve the sound development of
the national economy through the pursuit of price stability in the long run.
(2) However, the BOJ will not take such measures if the side effects are deemed
greater than the effects, which makes it difficult to achieve the objective in 
(1) above.
The first criterion is exactly the BOJ’s mandate as stipulated in Article 2 of 
the Bank of Japan Law. The second criterion requires comparing effects with side
effects in accomplishing the mandate. In weighing the effects and side effects, proper
evaluation of the economy is essential for making an appropriate policy decision.
II. A Response to Criticisms and Questions Regarding
Monetary Policy
A. Price Stability as a Mandate
1. Inflation targeting
Inflation targeting is one effective approach in the conduct of monetary policy, and
an increasing number of countries have adopted it recently. At the moment, the BOJ
has not adopted this approach because of (1) the difficulty in setting a target; and 
(2) the difficulty in achieving it.
Let me elaborate on the first difficulty. When we examine inflation targeting in
light of the first criterion which says that “the BOJ will take measures necessary to
achieve the sound development of the national economy through the pursuit of price
stability in the long run,” it boils down to the following difficult question: do we
have a good reason to believe that the sound development of the national economy
will be attained if we maintain the rate of increase in specific price indicators at a 
certain level? Price indicators such as the GDP deflator, CPI, and Wholesale Price
Index (WPI) often move differently. Even when these indicators exhibit the same
movement, the extent to which the sound development of the national economy 
will be achieved may depend on such factors as whether property prices are stable or
rising sharply.
Furthermore, even if we commit ourselves to a specific price indicator, the
changes in it may reflect not only factors related to monetary policy but also those
not directly related to monetary policy like a sudden rise in prices due to drought 
or the dramatic decline witnessed in the prices of computers due to technological
innovation. In other words, we need to solve such issues as to how to grasp an 
inflation trend that could be addressed by monetary policy, and to what extent we
should incorporate biases and measurement errors of the price index when analyzing
the changes in it.
2165
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With regard to the first difficulty in setting a target, there is the following
counterargument:  since many countries have already adopted inflation targeting,
there cannot be any excuse for not adopting it in Japan. In principle, this 
argument is correct, but in the case of Japan there are some special difficulties that
will be made apparent in the following paragraphs.
Countries that have experienced high inflation have adopted inflation targeting as
a measure geared toward disinflation. For example, both New Zealand and the U.K.
suffered from almost double-digit inflation for a long time and introduced targeting
as a way to combat it. In such a case, biases and measurement errors of the price
index on the order of a few percent do not matter much. Initially, one can introduce
inflation targeting by setting a tentative target with some range, for example 1 to 4
percent, and then once the inflation rate becomes low enough, one can reset a more
specific target level and its range.
3 However, since inflation is about zero percent in
Japan, we cannot take such a two-stage approach. Moreover, the possibility that the
effectiveness of inflation targeting in achieving sustainable growth may depend on
such factors as property prices seems to present particular difficulties in setting a 
target, since most of today’s problems in the Japanese economy were triggered by 
asset inflation including the rise in property prices.
It appears that in Japan many of those who believe in inflation targeting suggest its
adoption from the viewpoint that it could substantially raise inflationary expectations.
A criticism typically made from this standpoint is as follows: since deflationary expec-
tations are an issue at the moment, the BOJ should adopt inflation targeting to
directly work on expectations.
Against this criticism, the BOJ argues, as is recorded in the minutes of Monetary
Policy Meetings, that “since we cannot explicitly show the way to achieve the desired
inflation rate, such action would most likely result in the BOJ losing credibility.”
Such a view is deemed not a rejection of inflation targeting per se, but rather
reflects the current extraordinary state of the Japanese economy. The issue here is also
the difference in the state of the economy between the countries that adopted 
inflation targeting and Japan. Since the countries suffering from high inflation
adopted inflation targeting as a disinflationary measure, there seemed to exist a 
clear policy path for achieving the goal, i.e., raise interest rates and pursue a tight
monetary policy. In contrast, both the inflation rate and short-term interest rates are
virtually zero percent in Japan; there is no room left for further interest rate reduction
in the current situation to raise inflationary expectations. Thus, the BOJ’s Policy
Board members face the problem of whether they should consider the possibility 
of exploring innovative measures beyond the current policy framework, such as 
so-called “quantitative easing,” to effect additional monetary easing.
Let me turn to the effectiveness of working directly on expectations by adopting
inflation targeting, but not necessarily specifying a concrete path to achieve it. This
intends to work through an announcement effect, but such effect may or may not
work to raise inflationary expectations.
3. For an explanation regarding the economies of countries that introduced inflation targeting, see Bank of 
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Whether to take a particular course of action, the result of which is uncertain,
seems to be a balancing act between a position emphasizing that we should take
whatever action if there is a slight possibility of achieving the desired effects and one
emphasizing that we, as a responsible body, should not just make an announcement
unless there is clear and concrete policy action to follow. Taking into account the 
current state of the Japanese economy, introduction of inflation targeting would 
most likely result in impairing the BOJ’s credibility.
Of course, comparison of the effects and side effects does not always lead to the
same conclusion. If a pessimistic view such that the Japanese economy is about to
enter a deflationary spiral as was experienced in the U.S. during the Great Depression
prevails among Policy Board members, it may well be the case that the position
emphasizing the effects becomes dominant. Nevertheless, so far such thinking has
not dominated at Monetary Policy Meetings.
The BOJ’s stance of not adopting explicit inflation targeting so far may lead to
the following criticisms: The BOJ has an anti-inflation bias in conducting mone-
tary policy. When prices were rising, the BOJ stated its strong commitment to
preventing inflation but never referred to the future concern of deflation. On
the other hand, when prices were falling, the BOJ often stated that there should
be neither inflation nor deflation and mentioned the future concern of inflation.
Thus, the BOJ’s stance is biased. Once the BOJ announces its objective of price
stability with specific figures, it will have to deal with inflation and deflation in
a symmetrical manner. This criticism can be interpreted as a request for the BOJ to
devise ways to explicitly show under what conditions it would depart from its current
zero interest rate policy. Unless such a request is met to a sufficient degree, the BOJ
will not be able to dispel the concern of market participants regarding the continuity
of its policy stance.
2. Ways to reduce uncertainty regarding monetary policy operations
It appears that there has been a subtle change in how the BOJ announces its policy
operations. The statement of the Policy Board on February 12, 1999 noted that 
“the Bank of Japan has judged it appropriate to provide, through monetary policy
operations, the utmost support for economic activity in order to avoid possible 
intensification of deflationary pressure and to ensure that the economic downturn
will come to a halt.” In this statement, there is no mention of continuity regarding
the BOJ’s current policy. It is unclear from the discussion revealed in the minutes 
of that Monetary Policy Meeting as to how long the virtual zero interest rate policy
will last. This may be the reason why the market began looking for subsequent 
operational targets once it saw that the unsecured overnight call rate had become 
virtually zero percent.
About two months later, on April 13, Governor Hayami explicitly referred to 
the continuity of current policy by saying that “until we reach a situation in which
deflationary worries subside, we will continue the current policy of providing 
necessary liquidity to guide the unsecured overnight call rate down to virtually zero
percent while paying due consideration to maintaining the proper functioning of the
market. This is the consensus of the Monetary Policy Meeting on April 9.”167
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3. Can we go a step further?
If the BOJ were to go further, it could announce something like “we will not tighten
our policy, that is, maintain the overnight call rate at zero percent, until the trend
growth rate of CPI reaches X percent.”
Such a statement does not specify a targeted inflation rate like in inflation 
targeting. In this case, for example, the BOJ specifies a trend inflation rate of CPI 
as a reference point for policy changes. Then, we need to check whether or not the 
chosen reference point is effective in light of the following lesson that we learned
from the “bubble” period: in the “bubble” period, monetary tightening came too late
because the rise in general prices considerably lagged the steep rise in asset prices,
thus leading to a large swing in the subsequent business cycle.
All considered, there is no definite answer to the question as to whether or not an
explicit commitment to a specific inflation rate as a quantitative reference point
would be an effective measure in conducting monetary policy given the current state
of the Japanese economy.
B. Needs and Effects of the Outright Purchase of Government Bonds
1. Can we increase money supply by increasing reserves?
Since inflation is a monetary phenomenon, it is necessary to maintain money supply
growth at a level high enough to fight deflationary pressures. To this end, interest
rates should be lowered and ample reserves provided. But if it is judged desirable to
increase money supply, the question remains whether we will be able to automatically
increase it by injecting reserves. If the main constraint on the expansion of money
supply is not related to reserves, it is natural that money supply will not grow signifi-
cantly by providing ample reserves and reducing banks’ funding costs to around zero
percent. At present, banks are contributing to money supply growth by purchasing
government bonds and other assets instead of providing loans, thereby helping to
avoid deflation (Figure 6).
4
Constraints on the expansion of bank loans include such problems as (1) the
decline in the risk-taking ability of banks resulting from the erosion of their capital
due to nonperforming assets; (2) the lack of profitable projects; and (3) the inability
of many firms to borrow money because of the debt incurred on previous projects.
Even if firms can borrow money for a profitable project, they have to first repay 
the debt on other projects. Unless such problems are solved through appropriate
measures corresponding to the respective constraints, the provision of funds will not
result in the expansion of bank lending. For example, if the constraint is a decline in
banks’ risk-taking ability due to capital shortage, public funds need to be injected to
strengthen banks’ capital positions.
In a situation where the constraints remain, whether or not we continue to 
provide excess reserves needs to be determined by comparing the effects and side
effects of such an operation.
4. Given the market condition, it is unlikely that the provision of reserves will trigger a rapid increase in money 
supply. This is because, for example, long-term government bonds entail a large price volatility risk and the yield
on short-term government bills with small price volatility risk is declining (Figure 7).168 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 1999
Notes: 1. The data contrast the increase or decrease in M2+CDs with the changes in 
               the claims on the private nonbank sector, which are indicated respectively as 
               liabilities and their counterpart assets on the balance sheets of the financial 
               institutions surveyed.
           2. Contribution to change from a year ago by component = increase or decrease 
               from a year ago of each component/M2+CDs outstanding at the end of the 
               period (year earlier).
           3. The sum of the contributions does not necessarily equal changes in M2+CDs, 
               because the contributions of “claims on local governments” and “holdings of 
               corporate bonds and stocks,” which are quantitatively negligible, are not 
               described in the above figure.
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Figure 6  Changes in Money Stock (M2+CDs) and Credit169
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Figure 7  Interest Rates
2. A controversy regarding the BOJ’s outright purchase of government bonds
In relation to so-called quantitative easing, many economists both at home and
abroad
5 criticize the BOJ, saying that an increase in the outright purchase of long-
term government bonds is deemed effective for quantitative easing. The reason
the BOJ is reluctant to increase outright purchase, which is not legally forbid-
den like underwriting, is because it is overly conscious of its independence and
prestige, thereby tying its hands from taking effective policy measures.170 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 1999
To such a criticism, the BOJ has pointed out that (1) in the end it would 
essentially be the same as underwriting, which is prohibited by the Fiscal Law; 
(2) most central banks in industrialized countries mainly conduct the outright 
purchase of short-term government bills for monetary operation purposes; (3) it
would impair fiscal discipline; and (4) it might increase long-term interest rates.
For example, the BOJ contends that, based on its historical experience, once 
outright purchase by a central bank is built-in as an automatic funding source for the
government, it would become extremely difficult for both the government and the
central bank to exit from it. Against this, there is the following counterargument
regarding the loss of fiscal discipline: as long as the BOJ is an independent central
bank, it can suspend outright purchase or conduct open market selling opera-
tions at its own discretion. Hence, the BOJ’s outright purchase at the present
juncture may not necessarily put future fiscal discipline at risk. To date, this
point is still an inconclusive controversy.
There appears to be some confusion in the argument regarding the outright 
purchase of long-term government bonds because the implicit assumptions in the
conduct of monetary operations are not necessarily clear. I will try to put to rest such
confusion in the following section.
3. Relation with long-term interest rates: comparing with exchange rates
There are those who suggest that the BOJ should conduct the outright purchase or
underwriting of long-term government bonds because they believe such an operation
would have a strong effect in containing long-term interest rates. With regard to this
contention, two underlying questions have to be examined: one is whether or not the
BOJ should consider long-term interest rates as its policy objective, and the other is
whether or not the BOJ can control long-term interest rates by purchasing long-term
government bonds.
Regarding these questions, the BOJ has stated that long-term interest rates are
important indicators, though they are neither its policy objective nor controllable. 
I personally believe that it may be possible in theory to control long-term interest
rates but not feasible in practice, and that they should be regarded in the same way as
the foreign exchange rate under a floating exchange rate system.
Under a floating exchange rate system, the foreign exchange rate can be temporarily
influenced if the authorities intervene in the market unexpectedly or in concert, though
the effect of such “shock therapy” diminishes over time. After all, the foreign exchange
rate cannot be controlled at will simply by affecting the supply and demand of foreign
exchange through intervention. If the authorities should seriously wish to control the
foreign exchange rate, they will need to switch to a policy framework that fundamen-
tally alters the expectations of market participants, such as assigning monetary policy to
foreign exchange rate stability and returning to a fixed exchange rate system.
The same applies to long-term interest rates. They cannot be controlled simply by
the outright purchase of government bonds. If the BOJ dares to control long-term
interest rates, it will have to completely alter the expectations of market participants
by a fundamental shift in its policy framework similar to returning to a fixed
exchange rate system.171
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6. See Eichengreen and Garber (1999).
Under a fixed exchange rate system, freedom to assign monetary policy to the
domestic policy objective is completely lost. Similarly, in a policy framework in
which monetary policy is assigned to controlling long-term interest rates, freedom to
achieve the mandate stipulated in the Bank of Japan Law would be completely lost.
Like the case of a fixed exchange rate system where the authorities tend to maintain
the exchange rate until it diverges from the level warranted by economic fundamen-
tals to an intolerable extent, a policy framework that commits to long-term interest
rates would most likely cause considerable and intense reaction and have dire conse-
quences for the economy when it finally breaks down. In other words, while there
might be some immediate effects temporarily, large side effects would materialize
before long.
In the 1940s, U.S. monetary policy was geared to containing long-term interest
rates, but resulted in the collapse of the government bond market due to inevitable
pressure for a rise in interest rates.
6 Because of this, in the 1950s the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB) concluded an Accord with the Treasury which stated that the FRB 
was not responsible for the movement of long-term interest rates. Though this is an
experience in the U.S., I believe it is a valid historical lesson for Japan and constitutes
part of the background to the BOJ’s argument that it cannot control long-term 
interest rates.
Against this argument, there will be the following criticism: recognizing that 
long-term interest rates are not controllable over time as is the case with the 
foreign exchange rate, the BOJ intervenes in the foreign exchange market based
on the judgment that short-term volatility is not desirable. Why can’t the BOJ
intervene in the market with respect to long-term interest rates? When adverse
effects on the economy are anticipated, why doesn’t the BOJ allow a small increase
in the outright purchase of long-term government bonds as a smoothing 
operation, similar to its intervention in the foreign exchange market?
Regarding this criticism, one reason why the BOJ cannot make such a response
becomes obvious if we presume the following situation where an increase in the 
purchase of government bonds is not as effective as expected in controlling long-term
interest rates: suppose the market demands an increase in the purchase of govern-
ment bonds. If the BOJ did not respond, long-term interest rates would rise from
disappointment. Even if the BOJ did respond, there is no guarantee that long-term
interest rates could be controlled. And, if they could not be controlled, which is most
likely the case, continuing outright purchases in the hope they would be effective
would eventually be the same as a change in policy framework. Among industrialized
countries, a fixed exchange rate system is a viable option for a small country, but no
country, large or small, has a fixed long-term interest rate system. It seems much
more difficult for a central bank to fix long-term interest rates than to fix the foreign
exchange rate. Thus, a central bank cannot easily take up such an option unless it
stands ready to fundamentally alter its policy framework.172 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 1999
C. Holding of Government Bonds and the Balance Sheet Problem
With respect to the purchase of long-term government bonds, there is an opinion that
even if effects on long-term interest rates and inflation are small, the outright 
purchase of government bonds helps to improve the fiscal balance. Thus, the BOJ
should increase outright purchase operations. The well-known macroeconomist
Professor Fumio Hayashi of Tokyo University supports this opinion.
7 Whether the
BOJ should pursue such a policy depends on how the market views the impact of a
huge increase in government bond holdings on the BOJ’s balance sheet.
1. Is an “amalgamation approach” reasonable?
Many macroeconomists employ an approach that implicitly integrates the govern-
ment with the central bank (amalgamation approach) saying it could be profitable
for the “integrated government” to exchange interest-bearing government 
bonds with interest free reserves through the central bank’s purchase of 
government bonds.
In this regard, we need to examine the actual financial relationship between the
Japanese government and the BOJ. A clause in the old Bank of Japan Law whereby
the government was obliged to compensate for any losses incurred by the BOJ was
deleted in compiling the current Bank of Japan Law. Under the current Bank of
Japan Law, any profits are transferred to the government coffers, while any losses
incurred are borne by the BOJ.
The reason why central bank independence is respected under the current Bank
of Japan Law may be to avoid large mistakes resulting from the ambiguity of respon-
sibilities between the government and the central bank under the name of “integrated
government.” In this context, costs incurred by the action of a central bank should
naturally be borne by the central bank itself, thus evidencing its responsibility.
2. Are government bonds risk-free?
Those who consider government bonds the safest asset claim that even if the 
amalgamation approach, which integrates the government with the central
bank, is not applicable, government bonds are the most creditworthy asset avail-
able, certainly much safer than commercial paper (CP). Therefore, they would
not impair the central bank’s balance sheet regardless of the amount purchased.
It is true that from the viewpoint of issuer credibility, government bonds are 
the safest. However, it is not only credit risk that accompanies the holding of assets.
Price volatility risk must also be taken into account. Suppose we purchase 10-year
government bonds yielding 1 percent at ¥100. If the long-term interest rate rises to 
5 percent, the theoretical price of the bonds purchased will decline to ¥70. With
regard to this point, there will be the following counterargument: the BOJ should
change its accounting standard to the cost method, which assumes that govern-
ment bonds purchased are held to maturity. It should make use of bills drawn
for sale and short-term government bills when absorbing reserves.
The BOJ has so far been conducting the outright purchase of long-term 
government bonds in amounts roughly consistent with the trend growth of 
banknotes issued, but has never sold government bonds. If the BOJ were to hold
7. See Hayashi (1998).173
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8. From the standpoint of securing financial soundness so as to maintain currency credibility, the BOJ has adopted
the lower of cost or market method since the latter half of 1968.
9. The expansion of the BOJ’s balance sheet has led to suspicion regarding not only its financial soundness but also
other aspects. For example, “Addressing the U.S. Bubble” in the Financial Times of April 22, 1998, was one of
the first articles to focus on the “expansion” of the BOJ’s balance sheet and said that not only did such expansion
fail to buoy up the Japanese market but it also created bubbles elsewhere in the world.
10. For recent literature that deals with the central bank balance sheet problem, see Stella (1997).
government bonds in excess of the amount warranted by the trend growth of 
banknotes issued, it would be desirable if it could sell them to absorb reserves when
necessary. If there is a possibility of selling bonds, the accounting standard must 
be marked to market.
8 The cost method, if adopted, would conceal losses, which
leads to lack of transparency. On the other hand, if bonds could not be sold, they
would become quite illiquid, and hence not necessarily a prime asset from the 
viewpoint of the central bank.
3. Is the BOJ’s balance sheet special?
Of course, the BOJ can conduct monetary operations even though it is unable to sell
government bonds. For example, it can absorb reserves by selling bills drawn for sale
while holding government bonds. This operation will inevitably expand both assets
and liabilities on the BOJ’s balance sheet. Recently, the BOJ has often found that the
expansion of its balance sheet tends to bring its financial soundness into question in
markets both at home and abroad.
9
With respect to the BOJ’s balance sheet, we encounter the following criticism:
since price volatility risk is large for government bonds, holding them on a
marked to market basis would incur a loss when interest rates are rising.
However, as most central bank liabilities consist of banknotes that bear no 
interest, we should not treat a central bank’s balance sheet in the same way as
the balance sheet of a corporation in terms of price volatility risk.
Another almost opposite argument can be made if we apply the soundness 
criterion of a financial institution in general to a central bank’s balance sheet: to 
protect the national economy, the BOJ should tolerate the erosion of its balance
sheet to the extent the economic situation warrants.
Both arguments have some validity. What is important is how market participants
at home and abroad would view the erosion of the BOJ’s balance sheet and how it
would affect confidence in the Japanese economy.
10 Since the soundness of the BOJ’s
balance sheet has attracted considerable attention from both domestic and foreign
market participants, the BOJ must examine its operations involving government
bonds, keeping in mind that the erosion of credibility due to the impairment of 
its balance sheet runs the risk of having an adverse impact on confidence in the
Japanese economy.
At the close of this section, I would like to emphasize again that the following
simplistic view is wrong: “The BOJ is reluctant to increase the outright purchase 
of government bonds, even though it is not legally forbidden, because it is overly
conscious of its independence and prestige, which ties its hands from taking effective
policy measures.”
Since the BOJ is not legally constrained from increasing the purchase of govern-
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11. “A third member mentioned that, faced with unstable economic conditions, firms had to do their best to 
continue business by somehow acquiring necessary funds. The member stated that, therefore, the Bank’s [BOJ’s]
injection of ample funds into the market was essential. The member expressed the view that one option might be
to hold back as much as possible from absorbing funds in its daily operations. On the Bank’s [BOJ’s] operations
for absorbing funds, another member questioned what might happen in the money market if the Bank [BOJ]
ceased its bill-selling operation.” In this context, we first of all need to examine whether or not any problems arise
if the overnight call market contracts as a result of the zero interest rate policy. In fact, since February 1999, the
overnight call market has contracted rapidly (Figure 8). If there were a shortage of funds in the market, the BOJ
would likely be asked to substitute for the market function to provide the necessary funds. However, while 
official institutions can complement the market function, they cannot substitute for it to a sufficient degree, thus
the side effects of call market contraction must be carefully examined.
Nevertheless, if it should ever arise that such a decision had to be considered, Policy
Board members would certainly have to clear a significantly higher hurdle than just
the BOJ’s prestige.
D. Quantitative Indicators as a Guideline for Monetary Operations
1. Why does the BOJ absorb funds?
The BOJ is currently committed to providing ample liquidity to the short-term
money market and hence it may be natural to raise the following question: the BOJ
takes the stance of providing ample liquidity to the short-term money market
and has reduced the unsecured overnight call rate down to virtually zero per-
cent. Given that the outright purchase of government bonds can be conducted
in a limited amount, why doesn’t the BOJ pursue quantitative easing by not
conducting fund absorption operations?
In fact, according to the minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on February 12,
1999, a couple of Policy Board members had raised a similar question.
11 The BOJ’s
current directive for monetary operations is to provide reserves just sufficient for the
overnight call rate to be reduced to virtually zero percent. If the BOJ adopts a new
directive to flood the market with excess reserves, such provision of reserves should 
be conducted not in a disorderly manner, but rather in an orderly manner using 
some additional indicators as criteria. Specifically, this will lead to such suggestions as
(1) making quantitative indicators operational targets; and (2) controlling the
amount of reserves with some reference to short-term interest rates with maturity
longer than overnight.
2. Attractiveness and weakness of base money targeting
The most popular candidate for quantitative indicators seems to be base money,
which is the sum of currency in circulation and reserves. Since base money is mostly
composed of currency in circulation (recent figures show currency in circulation
totals about ¥50 trillion and reserves about ¥5 trillion), it has the advantage of being
easy for the public to understand. A commitment such as increasing cash in circula-
tion at a certain rate literally gives a picture of quantitative easing, and thus is quite
attractive as a message to the public.
Since a central bank cannot control the amount of cash in the purse of the public,
all operations of the central bank have to be geared toward reserves to implement
base money targeting. Accordingly, the balance of reserves would become very
volatile in a framework of base money targeting.175
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12. The balance of banknotes was ¥1,679 million on April 20, 1927, but increased to ¥2,318 million on April 21
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Figure 8  Amount Outstanding in the Call Money Market
For example, when demand for banknotes increases due to financial system 
instability, reserves must be reduced to contain the growth rate of base money within 
a targeted range. This would result in making the money market quite tight.
Furthermore, since the balance of reserves is at most one-tenth of banknotes and 
it cannot be negative, there may be a situation where keeping the target becomes 
impossible. In this context, a historical example that made a strong impression on me
is the financial depression in Japan in 1927, when at the peak of financial uncertainty
banknotes increased by an amazing 38 percent compared with the previous day and the
BOJ was forced to issue ¥200 banknotes that had been printed on only one side.
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Even as recently as 1997, when financial system uncertainty increased following
the collapse of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities, the growth
rate of the balance of banknotes (end month, year-on-year basis) increased rapidly
from 6.5 percent in September, to 8.3 percent in October, and 13.6 percent in
November. In contrast, when financial system stability has been restored and 
depositor trust in financial institutions is increasing, the growth rate of base 
money will decline under monetary easing. In this case, a central bank must inject
reserves to already-eased markets in order to meet the target for base money.
Subsequent periods after the financial depression of 1927 as well as after the
Hokkaido Takushoku–Yamaichi shock of 1997 witnessed a decline in demand for
base money under monetary easing.
These examples imply that the constant growth rate of base money does not 
necessarily mean that the central bank is maintaining a constant monetary easing
stance. While base money has a great advantage of being easy for the public to 
understand monetary easing, it has a big weakness in that it does not necessarily
reflect the true extent of monetary easing.
3. Effects of excess reserve targeting
The next possible candidate as a quantitative indicator is reserves. Reserve targeting
aimed at total reserves or non-borrowed reserves (i.e., central bank borrowing is
deducted) has been tried in the U.S., but as far as I know, in recent discussions in
Japan, there has been no suggestion that this kind of targeting should be introduced.
Professor Mitsuhiro Fukao of Keio University rejects base money targeting
because of its large seasonal fluctuations and suggests that the BOJ adopt excess
reserves, which is obtained by subtracting required reserves from total reserves, as an
operational target and increase it by ¥500 billion a month (¥6 trillion a year).
13
Excess reserves is a technical concept, and is not easy for the public to understand
as an indicator compared with interest rates or banknotes. On the other hand, the
possibility of meeting the target appears, in principle, to be higher in the case of
excess reserves than that of base money.
14 However, the idea contains a few problems.
The first is what kind of function can be expected of excess reserves since 
they earn no interest as long as they remain in the accounts held at the central 
bank. Whether or not excess reserves will produce profits depends on investment
opportunities. In this regard, the simplest money multiplier theory in finance text-
books assumes a world where banks cannot lend enough due to reserve requirements
though they have infinite lending opportunities. In this world, a central bank’s 
provision of reserves immediately results in the expansion of bank lending, which in
turn increases required reserves and then reduces excess reserves to zero. However, in
a situation where there are permanently excess reserves, and reserve requirements and
funding costs no longer bind the behavior of banks, or in a situation where it is not
the reserves of banks but their own capital positions or borrowers’ creditworthiness
13. See Fukao (1999).
14. One of the reasons I said “in principle” is because, during the recent monetary easing period, the current
accounts at the BOJ held by institutions that were not subject to reserve requirements increased substantially
compared with those held by financial institutions, thus “excess reserves” did not increase that much.177
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15. When banks hold excess reserves, it will be natural to modify the money multiplier formula, taking into account
that such excess reserves will leak from the multiplier process, and redefine base money as M =kH*, where H* is
base money after deducting excess reserves, M is money supply, and k is the money multiplier as a function of
the reserve ratio and cash-deposits ratio.
that constrain their lending, the accumulation of excess reserves does not warrant an
increase in bank lending.
15
Of course, the assets in which banks would invest are not confined to loans.
Therefore, if excess reserves accumulate beyond the needs of banks, there will arise
pressure for banks to invest the excess reserves in risky but profitable assets such as
stocks and bonds. So far, with interest rates staying at virtually zero percent and
opportunity cost being quite low, banks have tried to avoid holding excess reserves as
much as possible, and a phenomenon has been observed whereby the funds which
banks find unnecessary at 5 p.m. (market closing time) accumulate in the accounts 
of dealers (tanshi companies) held at the BOJ. Thus, it has been difficult to evaluate
the effect the BOJ’s operations have had on the investments of banks in stocks 
and bonds.
The second problem with excess reserves is reliability as an indicator for monetary
easing. Since the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves under zero interest rates
is quite low, demand for excess reserves, that is, to what extent banks want to hold
excess reserves, varies considerably depending on such factors as financial system 
stability. Thus, it is very uncertain, as was the case with base money, as to what 
extent monetary conditions would be further eased by keeping the level and/or
growth rate of excess reserves constant. To evaluate the extent of monetary easing, it
is, after all, not sufficient to fix the level and/or growth rate of excess reserves, and we
most likely need additional criteria to judge the impact. As an additional criterion,
for example, we could examine the shape of the yield curve. This is similar to shifting
the operational target from the overnight call rate, which has reached zero percent, to
term interest rates.
The third problem relates to an operational hurdle. If we receive a directive to
accumulate a considerable amount of excess reserves when term interest rates are at
quite a low level, there would be a possibility that existing tools for providing 
liquidity with short maturity such as repos, bills, and CP might not be sufficient 
to fulfill the directive. For example, the auction bid rate sometimes becomes zero 
percent in the current situation, whereupon the BOJ has to expand its short-term
operations to include those with a longer maturity that carry positive interest. If the
BOJ continues such expansion, it will finally lead to increased purchases of long-term
government bonds. And if the BOJ sets a target to increase excess reserves regardless
of the movement of term interest rates, we cannot deny the possibility that down the
line it will be forced to simultaneously solve two issues, one regarding increasing 
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E. Effective Monetary Policy under a Liquidity Trap
If it is possible to conduct monetary policy using quantitative indicators such as
excess reserve targeting through regular bill-selling operations or short-term govern-
ment bills operations, what will be the effects and side effects? To examine this 
question, it is useful to discuss the effectiveness of monetary policy under a liquidity
trap, a situation in which monetary policy is deemed least effective.
1. Liquidity trap and the depreciation of the yen
A central banker would typically comment that, under a liquidity trap, regular 
monetary policy operations to provide liquidity are not effective at all. However, a
prominent monetarist, Professor Allan Meltzer of Carnegie-Mellon University, argues
as follows. Suppose that with overnight interest rates virtually at zero percent,
the BOJ announces a target for the yen exchange rate to fall by 50 percent and
that it is prepared to print yen to buy U.S. dollars until it achieves the target. Is
there any doubt that the yen would depreciate or that the depreciation of the
yen would affect spending, output, and prices in Japan? In this way, he rejects the
ineffectiveness of monetary policy under a liquidity trap.
16
So far, the fixing of long-term interest rates through the unlimited purchase of
long-term government bonds seems to follow a similar argument. However, the 
big difference between the unlimited purchase of U.S. dollars and the unlimited 
purchase of long-term government bonds lies in their consequences over the long
term. If the central bank provided liquidity through the unlimited purchase of U.S.
dollars, it would be consistent with the depreciation of the yen even if inflation later
ensued. But if the central bank provided liquidity through the unlimited purchase 
of long-term government bonds, it would not be consistent with rising pressure on
long-term interest rates if inflation later ensued.
Looking at this problem from the viewpoint of a central bank’s balance sheet,
since the unlimited purchase of U.S. dollars would lead to a rise in its value, the 
central bank’s balance sheet would carry unrealized profits if such operations were
successful. To the contrary, the unlimited purchase of long-term government bonds
would run the risk of impairing a central bank’s balance sheet even upon successful
achievement of the objective.
In an economy with near zero interest rates, unlimited intervention in the foreign
exchange market (i.e., a return to a fixed exchange rate system, although Professor
Meltzer did not go so far as to suggest it) will be an attractive option if a central bank
seriously hopes that monetary policy will have permanent effects while avoiding the
erosion of its balance sheet that leads to loss of market credibility. 
In a situation with short-term interest rates at around zero percent and long-term
interest rates at the 1 percent level, if additional effects are expected from monetary
policy there are no policy options other than the one that induces a substantial 
depreciation of the yen, putting aside the question of whether or not to directly 
intervene in the foreign exchange market. In this regard, it is consistent for Professor
Meltzer to claim that the BOJ should aim at higher growth of money supply, and 
at the same time emphasize “the BOJ can use whatever measures to increase money
16. Meltzer (1999).179
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17. In an interview with the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 2, 1998 (in Japanese).
supply, and foreign exchange intervention is the best measure,” and “the only way to
stop deflation is for the yen to depreciate.”
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Is it really possible for a large economy like Japan to virtually return to a fixed
exchange rate system? Such an idea would not only provoke strong opposition from
the U.S. government and industry but also be criticized as a beggar-thy-neighbor 
policy by other Asian countries that compete with Japan in trade. Professor Meltzer
himself shrugs off these criticisms by saying that “it is natural for the currency of a
weak economy to depreciate” or “there will be no significant recovery in Asian
economies until Japan recovers.” However, it is our pragmatic judgment that even if
such a policy is deemed effective, the central bank could not easily adopt it in view of
the strong side effects it entails.
2. Quantitative easing and the depreciation of the yen
By comparing the suggestion of putting pressure on the yen to depreciate and 
virtually returning to a fixed exchange rate system with that of quantitative easing
through excess reserve targeting using regular market operations, what can we say in
terms of their effectiveness and side effects under a liquidity trap?
First, there is a relatively big question mark with respect to the effectiveness of
quantitative easing. Liquidity provision by the central bank has hardly any effect 
and only results in accumulating excess reserves. However, even if there is no effect 
in the short run, it will be possible, in principle, for the central bank to continue
quantitative easing. Such behavior of the central bank might have a slight chance of
inducing positive effects through raising the expectations of market participants
regarding continuity of the BOJ’s monetary easing.
What about the side effects? Since quantitative easing does not appear to have 
significant short-term effects, it does not cause immediate side effects, unlike the
intentional depreciation policy in the foreign exchange market, which brings such
side effects as immediate opposition from trading partners. The worst scenario might
be that the effects of previous monetary easing through the massive provision of
excess reserves may finally materialize just when the economic environment changes,
i.e., real economic growth and inflationary expectations are beginning to trend
upward, and monetary tightening becomes necessary. In this case, the side effects 
will appear later in the form of accelerated inflation caused by a delayed shift to 
monetary tightening.
3. Interest rates as additional criteria
If we emphasize the side effects described above, discussions will likely focus on
whether there is room for using interest rates as additional criteria even when
overnight interest rates are virtually at zero percent.
What we can think of first is that, after guiding overnight interest rates down to
zero percent, the BOJ may be able to use longer-term interest rates as its target.
However, for the period during which zero overnight interest rates are expected to
continue, term interest rates would also decline to around zero percent except for 
the risk premium. Hence, it is difficult, in theory, to guide term interest rates to a
desirable level different from virtually zero percent.180 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 1999
Looked at from a different viewpoint, it may not be utterly meaningless to have
term interest rates as a target. Allowing term interest rates to decline to around zero
percent could imply that the BOJ is committed to the average level of overnight
interest rates until the end of the periods covered by term interest rates. This policy
of tying one’s hands deprives monetary policy of its flexibility. In the current 
economic situation, the loss of flexibility may have a signaling effect with respect to
the BOJ’s policy and could be an effective communication tool vis-à-vis market 
participants. For example, if the BOJ holds a strong view that inflation will not be an
issue for at least one year and it is necessary to continue guiding overnight interest
rates virtually at zero percent, it could adopt a policy of guiding term interest rates of
up to one year down to zero percent.
It should be noted, however, that there is a subtle difference in the content of
monetary policy commitment between the case where term interest rates up to one
year become virtually zero percent and the case where the same development is 
realized as a result of announcing that the current policy will be continued until
deflationary worries subside. In the former case, the BOJ is committed to such 
monetary policy for a period of up to one year. In the latter case, what is realized 
is a reflection of the expectations of market participants who translated the
announcement into the prospect for interest rates.
III. Conclusion: Principles and New Questions
A. Principles
The basic principles regarding the conduct of monetary policy are as follows:
1. Price stability as a mission
The BOJ has a mission to contribute to the sound development of the national 
economy through the pursuit of price stability. Therefore, it should take the utmost
efforts to avoid deflation. In this context, it will not alter its policy stance toward
tightening until deflationary worries subside (i.e., the unsecured overnight call rate
will stay at virtually zero percent).
2. Provision of liquidity
Since inflation is a monetary phenomenon, it is necessary to maintain the stable
growth of money supply to avoid deflation. To this end, the BOJ will provide any
necessary reserves.
3. Additional directives for monetary policy operations
When it becomes necessary to adopt a new criterion (inflation targeting, excess
reserves targeting, term interest rate targeting, etc.) to reduce uncertainty regarding
monetary policy, the BOJ will make a decision by comparing the effects and side
effects. It is extremely important to make a comparison in the context of the state of
the Japanese economy.181
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B. New Questions
This paper has examined a framework for monetary policy and the principles derived
from it. Reaching this point, readers may be left with two interrelated questions.
The first question is: if the BOJ conducts monetary policy based on the prin-
ciples described above, can the Japanese economy achieve sustainable growth?
Unfortunately, this remains, in my view, an open question. What monetary policy
alone can do is limited. As the Japanese economy is exposed to strong structural
adjustment pressure including the disposal of nonperforming assets, the BOJ has
taken the utmost efforts to promote monetary easing. As a result, Japan has so far
been successful in avoiding deflation, but monetary policy alone cannot guarantee a
return of the economy to a sustainable growth path. To this end, it is essential to
solve structural problems.
18 Monetary policy can only prepare an environment 
conducive to structural adjustment, it is not a remedy.
The second question is: as a criterion in formulating principles regarding
monetary policy, this paper claims that the BOJ should not adopt a policy
where the side effects are greater than the effects. Couldn’t the current low 
interest rate policy cause some harm? The answer is yes. It could cause some harm.
Strong medicine has strong side effects. As recorded in the minutes of Monetary
Policy Meetings, there have been minority opinions regarding the side effects of
extremely low interest rates. In relation to the first question, low interest rates as a
pain-reliever may induce a further delay in the progress of structural adjustment. 
For example, if interest rates are high, it will be costly to hold excess equipment,
excess inventory, and nonperforming assets. However, if interest rates are close to zero
percent, financing costs of the above excesses will become quite small. When the
economy recovers, nonperforming loans could become collectable, excess inventories
could be sold, and excess equipment could become operational. In anticipation of
such developments, the current situation of extremely low interest rates gives an
incentive for corporate management to postpone the resolution of these excesses.
It is desirable to maintain current monetary easing despite the side effects. This 
is the decision made by the BOJ’s Policy Board, which believes that under current 
conditions it is the most supportive policy for economic recovery.
18. See Murayama (1999).182 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 1999
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Since the bursting of Japan’s bubble in stock and land prices in 1991, the Bank of
Japan (BOJ) has been under severe criticism—both domestic and foreign—for not
doing more to halt the economy’s deflationary slump. Most recently, in 1999, the
critics have focused on whether the BOJ should or should not sterilize foreign
exchange interventions designed to halt another upward surge in the yen—a surge
that further aggravates the deflationary pressure impeding recovery.
Specifically, in 1999 the BOJ intervened several times without success to slow the
yen’s rise from ¥120 per U.S. dollar in early June to ¥104 by late September.
However, the BOJ chose to sterilize the monetary impact of these interventions. 
Yet the Ministry of Finance wanted the interventions to be unsterilized, i.e., for the
monetary base to expand by the domestic value of the large increase in foreign
reserves, in order to be more effective and to stimulate the flagging economy.
Subsequently, at a meeting of the G-7 finance ministers in Washington, D.C., on
September 24 and 25, they too put pressure on the BOJ to be more “expansionary”
as a condition for securing potential future international cooperation to contain 
the yen’s rise. 
As Okina (1999) correctly emphasizes, this particular criticism (and several 
others) of the BOJ is misplaced. Short-term interest rates are already trapped at zero
with the monetary base “overexpanded” in a liquidity trap. As long as expectations
governing the exchange rate and interest rates on yen assets remain unchanged, the
BOJ cannot itself affect the exchange rate or domestic output no matter whether its
interventions are sterilized or unsterilized. However, joint intervention with foreign
central banks to contain the yen’s rise could change these expectations.
In these comments, I shall consider each of Dr. Okina’s main points, rebutting the
critics of the BOJ, from the alternative theoretical perspective developed in
McKinnon and Ohno (1997, forthcoming) and in subsequent research papers. So
first comes a brief synopsis of this alternative theory.
McKinnon-Ohno in Brief
The key to understanding Japan’s monetary dilemma, i.e., pressure for yen apprecia-
tion in a low-interest rate trap, is the expectation that the yen is likely to be higher
10, 20, or 30 years from now than it is today. McKinnon and Ohno (1997) argue
that this long-term expectation can only be damped by a strong signal from the
United States—such as (sustained) joint intervention by the Fed and the BOJ—to
prevent the U.S. dollar value of the yen from drifting ever upward.
Comments on “Monetary Policy
under Zero Inflation”
Ronald I. McKinnon
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The expectation of an ever-higher yen is not new. Since 1971, when the exchange
rate was ¥360 to the U.S. dollar, yen appreciation in nominal terms averaged about 
4 percent per year through 1999, when the rate is now about ¥104 per U.S. dollar.
From 1971 through April 1995, when the yen peaked out at ¥80 to the U.S. dollar,
we posited that the yen appreciation arose largely from mercantile pressure from the
United States—often associated with trade disputes between the two countries. The
United States focused on its deteriorating trade position, and Japan was the United
States’ largest and most aggressive trading partner. 
In mid-1995, U.S. policy changed. The U.S. Treasury announced a “strong 
dollar” policy, and since then the yen has come down from its peak. Nevertheless, 
the unbalanced political economic interaction between the two countries instills the
fear that this relief is only temporary. Indeed, the great burgeoning of the U.S. trade
deficit (and Japanese trade surplus) in 1999 reinforces the expectation that U.S. 
mercantile pressure will return.
But mercantile pressure from the United States is not the whole story. There 
exists a second complementary channel for upward pressure on the yen. For about 
20 years, Japan has run current-account surpluses with the rest of the world. Apart
from official capital outflows from Japan, much of this cumulative current-account
surplus has been financed by Japanese financial institutions—banks, insurance 
companies, trust funds, and so on—adding to their stocks of U.S. dollar claims.
True, U.S. dollar assets carry much higher nominal yields than yen assets. But the
currency risk, i.e., the possibility of capital losses from yen appreciation, seen by these
institutions is now much higher than it was 20 years ago. Because their existing
stocks of U.S. dollar claims are greater, Japanese financial institutions are more 
reluctant to continue acquiring dollar claims in the late 1990s. And without such
financial cover, today’s current-account surplus will itself drive the yen upward—
apart from any direct mercantile pressure from the United States. And this possibility
inhibits Japanese private investment.
Not surprisingly, this persistent upward pressure on the yen was recognized in the
financial markets more than 20 years ago. Following the principle of open interest 
parity, Japanese interest rates at all terms to maturity have averaged about 4 percentage
points less than American rates since 1978. And this differential has not diminished in
the late 1990s, even in periods when the yen took the markets by surprise and fell
against the U.S. dollar. The market expectation that the yen will rise in the future,
even when it is (surprisingly) weak in the present, remains remarkably robust.
In the 1970s and 1980s when U.S. nominal interest rates and expected inflation
were quite high, having lower interest rates and correspondingly lower wholesale 
price inflation was not a problem for Japan. In the mid-1990s, however, inflationary
expectations in the United States diminished and U.S. interest rates came down to
more moderate levels. Then, Japanese interest rates, having to be 4 percentage points
or so less by the expectation of ongoing yen appreciation, were forced toward zero as
Japan’s Wholesale Price Index (WPI) fell. Thus, Japan’s liquidity trap and relative
deflation, as best measured by a broad tradable goods index like the WPI, has been
externally imposed as an incidental rather than deliberate outcome of U.S. policies. 
According to McKinnon and Ohno (1997, forthcoming), ending the expectation185
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of an ever-higher yen and of ongoing WPI deflation in Japan requires a mercantile
and exchange rate agreement with the United States in order to credibly stabilize the
U.S. dollar value of the yen in the long run. In the absence of such an agreement and
with the continued expectation of a higher yen, there is relatively little the BOJ itself
can do to reflate Japan’s economy or to allow it to escape from the liquidity trap.
Thus, we agree with Dr. Okina that most of the criticism leveled at the BOJ for not
being sufficiently inflationary is misplaced.
Let us now consider some of Dr. Okina’s specific responses to these criticisms
from this McKinnon-Ohno perspective.
1. THE FALL IN THE U.S. CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) FROM 1929 TO 1933 IN THE
GREAT DEPRESSION WAS MUCH GREATER THAN THE FALL IN JAPAN’S CPI IN THE 1990S.
Indeed, Japan’s CPI has not fallen in the 1990s but has grown about 1 percent 
per year. Thus, by international standards, the BOJ can fairly claim to be meeting a
reasonable inflation target in the 1990s. But there are two problems here. 
The first is that the CPI may not be the best measure of persistent deflationary 
pressure. Because the Balassa-Samuelson effect still seems to be strong in Japan, the
WPI has fallen substantially since 1985—and fallen even more relative to its U.S. coun-
terpart. And of course land prices continue to fall. So if one deflates nominal interest
rates with these price indices instead of the CPI, real interest rates in Japan are higher. 
The second problem is persistence itself. The sharp fall in the U.S. price level
from 1929 to 1933 surprised everyone—and it is hardly likely that further falls of
that magnitude would have been anticipated in the U.S. financial markets in the later
1930s. (However, some Fisher effect to lower U.S. interest rates in the 1930s likely
was present.) In contrast, the persistent U.S. pressure to get the yen up from 1971
through 1995, and the fear that that pressure could return in the new millennium, is
more than two decades old. A persistent effect is more likely to be anticipated by the
market. Thus, persistent upward pressure on the yen could drive Japanese nominal
interest rates below U.S. ones—even though Japan experienced no traumatic fall in
prices comparable to what the United States experienced in the early 1930s. 
2. HAS JAPAN’S MONETARY POLICY BEEN ACCOMMODATING?
Dr. Okina is right to stress that the BOJ has been accommodating. Since 1994, there
has been a big fall in the velocity of base money (McKinnon [1999])—and broader
monetary aggregates have continued to expand relative to Japanese GNP.
Nevertheless, the word “accommodating” is the right one. If an outside force 
(the expectation of a higher yen and lower domestic WPI) drives nominal interest
rates down while making private investment look risky, then the demand for base
money will increase because (1) nominal interest rates are driven close to zero; and
(2) the speculative demand for money increases because of greater volatility in the
foreign exchange and long-term bond markets.
Although the BOJ (passively) accommodates this increased demand for base
money, it is incapable of using domestic monetary measures alone to (actively)
expand the economy. The BOJ’s helplessness is particularly evident in the liquidity
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Thus, Dr. Okina is perfectly right in saying that simply announcing a high 
inflation target (as called for by Krugman [1998a, 1998b]) would not be credible as
long as the BOJ has not the means to implement it. A massive devaluation of the yen
is infeasible for the reasons he correctly points out. There could be a substantial loss
of credibility from the announcement effect itself. 
Targeting excess commercial bank reserves may or may not be feasible technically.
But even higher excess reserves would also fail to expand the economy when the 
speculative demand—even by banks—for base money is almost unlimited. 
3. SHOULD THE BOJ BUY GOVERNMENT BONDS?
From the point of view of an integrated government, it does not much matter
whether the BOJ buys government bonds or the public trust funds (based on the
postal savings) buy them. Both institutions would bear the risk of large capital 
losses should nominal interest rates rise back to normal levels. Even apart from the
possibility of incurring capital losses, however, it is probably better that the BOJ not
set a precedent by underwriting government bonds directly.
4. THE CONSTRAINT ON YEN DEPRECIATION
I have argued that the yen’s market value today need not naturally depreciate in the
face of growing excess domestic liquidity as long as the future yen is expected to be
(erratically) higher. However, there exists an additional political-economic constraint
on how much the government could attempt to depreciate the yen in real terms.
Suppose, to stimulate the slumping but very large Japanese economy, unrestrained
monetary expansionists—see Meltzer (1998) and Krugman (1998a, 1998b)—aimed
for a sharp yen depreciation below its current purchasing power parity (PPP) rate.
This would fail on several counts:
(1) The domino effect: Other Asian currencies would be forced to depreciate 
further. In particular, the finely balanced position of China, where the yuan/
U.S. dollar rate has been stable for more than five years, would be undermined. 
(2) Protectionist responses from other industrialized countries: Already in 1999, a
major trade dispute is brewing over a surge in Japanese steel exports into the
U.S. market.
(3) The expectations effect: The fear of future yen appreciation could still remain
and even be strengthened if expectations about the long-term value of the yen
are little changed in the face of current yen depreciation.
Particularly in view of Japan’s large trade surplus, almost all protagonists in the
current debate recognize the potential calamity if the yen were to depreciate sharply
relative to its current PPP rate of about ¥120 to the U.S. dollar. So Japanese mone-
tary policy is trapped in two important respects: nominal interest rates cannot be
reduced further and the spot value of the yen cannot be significantly devalued in the
foreign exchanges. However, in proper long-term perspective, it is the yen’s (distant)
future value in nominal terms, and not so much today’s spot value in real terms, 
that is too high.187
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5. “IF THE AUTHORITIES SHOULD SERIOUSLY WISH TO CONTROL THE FOREIGN
EXCHANGE RATE, THEY WILL NEED TO SWITCH TO A POLICY FRAMEWORK THAT
FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERS THE EXPECTATIONS OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS” 
(OKINA [1999]).
Dr. Okina’s statement is completely correct and is consistent with McKinnon-Ohno.
But, in addition, we believe that stabilizing the value of the yen in the long run needs
the cooperation of the United States because the Americans were more or less respon-
sible for the problem in the first place. This is the key to ending the expectation of an
ever-higher yen and the deflationary pressure on the Japanese economy. 
If such a joint Japanese-U.S. program of long-term yen stabilization became 
credible, say, around a benchmark of ¥120 to the U.S. dollar (the exact number is not
important as long as a long-term benchmark exists), nominal interest rates in Japan
would jump upward toward international levels. Then, to keep the exchange rate stable,
the BOJ might actually have to contract the current monetary base as the demand for
base money falls. In effect, the Krugman-Meltzer proposal to greatly expand today’s
monetary base would make the BOJ’s final adjustment problem more difficult.
What about expanding the monetary base in conjunction with BOJ intervention
in the foreign exchanges to dampen yen appreciation, i.e., the issue of sterilized 
versus unsterilized intervention? Clearly, with an externally imposed liquidity trap
and base money in circulation already in “excess,” the sterilization issue is not 
important, and unilateral action by the BOJ is likely to fail. 
It would be worthwhile for the BOJ to undertake unsterilized intervention only if
it became necessary for securing U.S. cooperation. However, if the signaling effect of
successive joint interventions successfully ended the expectation of an ever-higher yen
so that nominal interest rates on yen assets rose, the demand for monetary base
would fall. Thus, the new base money created by the unsterilized intervention would
have to be quickly withdrawn in order to prevent sharp yen depreciation. 
In conclusion, the primary problem is to spring the liquidity trap for Japanese
monetary policy by ending the expectation of an ever-higher yen through joint action
by the Japanese and U.S. governments. Once the threat of sudden yen appreciation 
is eliminated, private investment in Japan could surge. Numerous criticisms of 
the BOJ, including the issue of sterilized versus unsterilized intervention, are of 
secondary importance and generally are not warranted. But such criticisms have
deflected attention from the main problem: the need to quash the expectation that
the yen will rise over the longer term.188 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 1999
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ReferencesIt is a pleasure to have the opportunity to respond to Dr. Okina’s defense of the 
policy of the Bank of Japan (BOJ). I believe he has made as good a case as we are
likely to see. I want to begin by agreeing with two important points that he makes.
First, Japan is not in a “great depression” nor has it experienced a rise in un-
employment or decline in income, prices, and money comparable to U.S. experience
in 1929–33 or, for that matter Japan’s experience at that time. Declines in stock
prices, land, and housing prices have drastically reduced household wealth in Japan,
and commercial banks’ loan losses exceed losses in the United States during the Great
Depression, but the similarity ends there.
Second, we agree that Japan is not in a “liquidity trap” where monetary policy is
powerless to affect prices, output, or other key variables. Wages and product prices
have fallen. Land and housing prices continue to decline, and the yen-U.S. dollar
exchange has appreciated from ¥145 in June 1998 to about ¥104 as I write. None of
this experience seems consistent with a liquidity trap. A more likely explanation is that
the fall in prices and the appreciation of the yen reflect an excess demand for money.
Dr. Okina, and many others, describes monetary policy as easy or accommodative.
I do not agree. Falling prices and appreciating currency suggest that wealth-owners 
(at home and abroad) want to hold more Japanese money balances than the BOJ has
provided. The public cannot create more yen balances, but they can increase the real
value of their yen balances by demanding yen. Their demands force the price level down
and appreciate the yen-U.S. dollar exchange rate.
If the BOJ increased the growth rate of money, it would help to achieve four
important goals: (1) stop current and expected future deflation of wages and prices;
(2) convert an excess demand for money into an excess supply, encouraging spend-
ing; (3) stop the fall in housing and land prices, thereby strengthening the financial
system and ending the erosion of real wealth; and (4) depreciate the exchange rate,
improving the competitive position of Japanese producers in world markets. The first
three goals are not controversial, though there are differences about the means of
achieving them. The fourth goal has been controversial, so I will discuss that.
The argument is often made that devaluation of the yen is harmful to Japan’s
neighbors and trading partners. Japan, it is said, should not recover at others’
expense. Such statements are based on a misunderstanding. The real exchange rate—
the quoted exchange rate adjusted for differences in prices at home and abroad—
must change to restore Japan’s competitive position in the world economy. The only
issue is not whether the real exchange rate changes, but how.
Comments: What More
Can the Bank of Japan Do?
Allan H. Meltzer
The Allan H. Meltzer University Professor of Political Economy, 
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There are three possibilities. First, Japan can use expansive monetary policy to
devalue its quoted (or market) exchange rate. Second, it has been doing the opposite
recently, so it must in the future let prices and wages fall enough to restore 
equilibrium. Third, it can hope that the United States, Europe, and others inflate
enough to ease the Japanese adjustment. Or it can rely on a mixture of price and
exchange rate changes.
Putting aside hopes that principal foreign countries inflate, wage and price 
deflation is the alternative to devaluation. There are no others. Those who oppose
devaluation as too costly for Japan’s neighbors and trading partners should recognize
that Japanese deflation is expensive also, for its trading partners, its neighbors, and its
citizens. In my view—supported by the experience of the past decade—devaluation
would be a cheaper, and I believe, faster way to restore prosperity to Japan and 
its neighbors.
The Japanese work force is talented and productive. Japanese producers in many
industries have been creative and strong competitors. That’s why Japan has become
the world’s second largest economy. Although there are the much-discussed structural
problems, there is a competitive core that would take advantage of the yen’s devalua-
tion to produce more. As Japan returned to high employment and growth, imports
from neighbors and trading partners would increase. The yen would appreciate.
Japan’s growth would help to restore Asian prosperity and contribute to growth of the
world economy.
Dr. Okina compares buying long-term bonds to buying U.S. dollars as a means 
of expanding money. Either or both would work. Indeed, both would work about 
the same way, and it would not be possible for an outsider to know which policy 
was followed unless he or she looked at the BOJ’s balance sheet to see what the BOJ
had bought.
Almost two years ago, I urged the BOJ to take five actions: (1) increase the 
monetary base by purchasing any asset (other than treasury bills that have zero yield;
(2) announce that the policy of buying assets would continue as long as the threat of
deflation remains or is expected to return; (3) announce that the private sector has
responsibility for ending the decline in asset prices, but the BOJ’s policy would 
support their efforts by ending deflation and stimulating spending; (4) accept that
the government (or its agents) must absorb many of the financial system’s losses; and
(5) allow the exchange rate to depreciate (temporarily) as required by the expansive
monetary policy.
The position of the banking system has improved, and the economy has stopped
declining. If the BOJ would take the other proposed actions, Japan would return to
noninflationary economic growth sooner.
Finally, permit me to comment on the safety or solvency of the BOJ. I do not
believe that the purchase of long-term bonds would jeopardize its reputation or
safety. There is little reason to believe that restoration of noninflationary growth
would raise interest rates enough to impair the BOJ’s solvency. Further, many 
privately owned banks and financial institutions in Japan, the United States, and 
elsewhere have operated for long periods with impaired balance sheets. Both the
Japanese and U.S. governments have current and prospective future liabilities far in191
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excess of their assets. Yet the public regards U.S. or Japanese government securities as
two of the safest assets in the world. I see no reason to believe there would be any
doubt about the government’s obligation to stand behind the BOJ. No central bank
has ever faced default, and no responsible government would permit that to happen.
It is unclear to me what could be meant by failure of a central bank. 
The BOJ should put its fears and concerns aside. Monetary expansion to end
deflation is desirable for Japan, Asia, and the rest of the world. It is a mistake to let
concerns about short-term costs, such as temporary currency depreciation, delay
longer-term benefits by continuing the deflationary policy of recent years. And 
this is especially true since the costs are less than the costs of continued recession 
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As succinctly summarized at the beginning of Professor McKinnon’s comment, we
have seen new waves of controversy concerning the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ’s) monetary
policy management since my paper, “Monetary Policy Under Zero Inflation,” was
written in early summer. 
In their comments on my paper, Professors McKinnon and Meltzer take into
account such developments, and their views seem to respectively represent those of
protagonists and antagonists with respect to the BOJ’s monetary policy. I would 
thus like to respond to the comments of my distinguished colleagues and to further 
discuss issues with which the BOJ is faced. 
In the following, I will focus on several important issues referred to by both 
gentlemen in their comments and present additional views in response to the 
criticism of the esteemed monetarist, Professor Meltzer. 
A. Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy
I believe that there is a general consensus that the current state of the Japanese 
economy is quite different from what was seen during the Great Depression in the
U.S. Indeed, this is one of two important points on which Professor Meltzer agrees. 
While Professor McKinnon also shares the same opinion, he emphasized the fact
that the Wholesale Price Index (WPI), used as a measure of prices in Japan, has fallen
substantially since 1985, and that the downward trend may likely be more persistent
than during the Great Depression. To this I would only say that while the fact that
the WPI in Japan fell almost consistently even in the 1980s (which includes the
“bubble” period) is certainly interesting from the viewpoint of the McKinnon-Ohno
hypothesis, it refutes rather than supports the belief that Japan is on the verge of a
deflationary spiral as observed during the Great Depression.
This fact has, in my opinion, quite a significant implication since monetary policy
responses can be essentially different during a deflationary spiral and a deep recession
without a deflationary spiral. If an economy is on the verge of a deflationary spiral as
observed during the Great Depression, the central bank concerned would naturally
try to prevent such a scenario from materializing by taking all possible measures at its
disposal, while thoroughly recognizing the substantial side effects such measures
might induce. In such a situation, a central bank would even consider a substantial
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liquidity to the market, as well as discussing with the government how to deal with
the erosion of the central bank’s balance sheet stemming from such purchases.
However, the absorption of government bonds by the BOJ would be akin to
introducing a drug into the economy, since if the government came to accept such
indulgence there is a very real risk that it would be difficult to end such absorption
because it would be too painful, as is evidenced by historical experience, and might
impair the national interest of Japan from a long-term perspective. 
In this context, it is noteworthy that there are some who, in view of the recent
accumulation of fiscal deficits, predict that Japan might follow the same path as 
the Weimar Republic, whose massive budget deficit was monetized by the central
bank’s underwriting of government bonds, only resulting in economic crisis with
hyperinflation, capital flight, and a GDP decline. 
Hence, only if an economy faces the risk of tumbling into a situation experienced
by the U.S. in the past, when prices and GDP fell by double-digit rates and massive
unemployment occurred, might a central bank seriously consider whether it dares to
follow such a course. 
When an economy appears to be recovering based on such economic indicators as
real GDP growth and various survey results, there will inevitably be upward pressure
on forward-looking economic variables including the foreign exchange rate and 
long-term interest rates. Therefore, when rises in the foreign exchange rate and 
long-term interest rates are caused by such pressure and are not deemed to force the
economy into a deflationary spiral, implementation of the aforementioned drastic
additional monetary policy because of a continuing recession would, given its large
side effects, impair not only the soundness of the central bank but also that of the
entire economy. 
Therefore, since the Japanese economy is in this kind of situation, the BOJ can do
nothing else but ensure its zero interest rate policy permeates and put the economy
back on a steady recovery path.
While Professor McKinnon accepted that the current state of the Japanese 
economy differs from that during the Great Depression and concurred with me that
current monetary policy is quite accommodative, Professor Meltzer advocated that
the BOJ take further monetary easing because of the decline in producer prices,
wages, and land prices, and also the appreciation of the yen.
In this regard, I cannot agree with Professor Meltzer. The continuous decline in
the WPI is, as Professor McKinnon pointed out, a long-term trend and has nothing
to do with a deflationary spiral. To begin with, if Professor Meltzer emphasizes the
decline in wages and prices, I do not understand why he agrees with me that the 
current situation differs from the Great Depression.
Examining his subsequent comments on the foreign exchange rate, he seems to
focus more on the appreciation of the yen than the decline in wages and prices.
However, when we look at the long-term development of the yen-U.S. dollar rate, to
which Professor McKinnon referred, the yen has been consistently appreciating
against the U.S. dollar except for the early 1980s. If such an appreciation indicates 
a tightness of monetary policy, then monetary policy in Japan has been almost 
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and following which high inflation was seen in the early 1970s, and the “bubble”
economy emerged in the late 1980s. 
Even viewed theoretically, it is natural that the currency of a capital exporting
country is subject to pressure for appreciation due to the accumulation of credit, as
Professor McKinnon argued, and since what affects the foreign exchange rate (which
is the relative price of currencies) is the monetary policy of Japan and the U.S., the
view that the BOJ should further ease monetary policy since the appreciation of 
the yen is evidence of a tight monetary policy does not seem at all convincing.
Professor Meltzer’s concerns over the appreciation of the yen would appear to
stem from his belief that a strengthening of Japan’s competitiveness through a 
depreciation in the yen’s real exchange rate (which is adjusted by prices) is inevitable
for the world economy, and the issue is whether to achieve it via deflation or a 
depreciation of the yen. It is true that, if we accept the necessity for the yen to 
depreciate, it would be easy to understand a proposal such as “Since a depreciation of
the yen is desirable and less costly than deflation for other countries, Japan should
accept it.” While I completely agree with Professor Meltzer’s view that “As Japan
returned to high employment and growth, imports from neighbors and trading 
partners would increase. The yen would appreciate. Japan’s growth would help to
restore Asian prosperity and contribute to growth of the world economy,” 
unfortunately it is rather difficult to assume that Japan’s neighbors and trading 
partners share his belief that strengthening Japan’s competitiveness is inevitable 
for the world economy.
B. Monetary Policy and Realizing a Depreciation of the Yen
It is without doubt that excessive appreciation of the yen would have adverse impact
not only on the Japanese economy but also on the entire world. As a conceptual
experiment, let us assume that excessive appreciation of the yen took place and 
that Japan’s neighbors and trading partners share Professor Meltzer’s belief that
strengthening of Japan’s competitiveness via a depreciation of the yen’s real exchange
rate is inevitable for the world economy. In such a case, what can Japan do, and what
should it do, in order to see the yen depreciate? There are two possible answers. One
is further monetary easing as Professor Meltzer advocates, and the other is a shift in
the foreign exchange rate regime as Professor McKinnon mentioned.
Let us first look at monetary easing. Behind such thinking is one of the most basic
elements of foreign exchange determination theory, namely, the interest parity equa-
tion that relates interest rate difference to the degree of foreign exchange depreciation. 
Taking this equation into account, it is natural that foreign exchange intervention
which is not accompanied by monetary policy is less effective. However, monetary
policy cannot affect the foreign exchange rate through interest rate parity when 
interest rates are at almost zero, and moreover, since financial institutions are already
holding a sizable amount of excess reserves the transmission path from monetary 
policy to the foreign exchange rate would be quite indirect and blurred even if 
the central bank doubled excess reserves through additional monetary easing. While
some would expect announcement effects, no transmission mechanism exists to 
support such expectations permanently. 195
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The only possibility in this context is if the initial announcement is understood as
being the central bank’s commitment to further easing of monetary conditions if the
yen further appreciates, which would lead to a commitment to the policy described
under Section A above. Indeed, if the central bank dramatically increased money 
supply by pursuing a type of monetary policy responding to a Great Depression 
situation, the yen would certainly depreciate. 
Because of such a policy, however, fiscal discipline would be lost and government
bond prices would collapse. The cost would be high. Thus, the BOJ is not likely to
take such an option unless Japan is faced with a real deflationary spiral. Bearing 
this in mind, I cannot think of any reason why Professor Meltzer nevertheless 
proposes further monetary easing other than that he doesn’t regard the central bank
purchase of government bonds as a drug and the ensuing costs to the national 
economy as substantial. 
Professor McKinnon referred to the central bank’s underwriting of government
bonds as follows: “Even apart from the possibility of incurring capital losses, however,
it is probably better that the BOJ not set a precedent by underwriting governments
bonds directly.” I believe Professor McKinnon is correct in this regard, and that 
the difference of views stems from the wide gap in their assessment of Japan’s 
monetary policy. 
The other answer is a regime change that commits unlimited intervention to
achieve a target foreign exchange rate. Professor McKinnon says it is a regime change,
including concerted intervention, that is essentially necessary to prevent the yen 
from appreciating. If the market believes the Ministry of Finance (MOF) will 
conduct unlimited intervention to maintain a targeted rate, the foreign exchange 
rate would depreciate. 
But why should the market believe that the MOF decides to conduct unlimited
intervention? It is because the current Bank of Japan Law stipulates that “the Bank
shall buy and sell foreign exchange as an agent of government . . . , when its 
purpose is to stabilize the exchange rate of the national currency,” and that the 
BOJ consequently only conducts business as an agent of the MOF in foreign
exchange intervention.
If the BOJ is to support such intervention on the part of monetary policy, its
option is to maintain zero interest rates so that such unlimited intervention will not
be disturbed from the monetary side. Bearing this point in mind, the argument 
for unsterilized intervention, as Professor McKinnon pointed out, not only is of 
secondary importance but also lacks validity when base money in circulation is
already in “excess.”
Then, is there nothing that the BOJ can do? If the market is skeptical about 
the BOJ’s support for unlimited intervention by the MOF alone, as an effective 
supporting policy other than maintaining the zero interest rate policy, the Bank of
Japan Law should be revised or interpreted differently so that the BOJ can intervene
in the market using its own funds in close cooperation with the MOF but based on
an independent decision. 
In such a case, would the BOJ share the burden of unlimited intervention with
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not mind whether the yen appreciates or not, it would refuse to intervene in the 
market using its own funds. Its posture would be tested at this point.
However, given that the floating exchange rate system has prevailed among 
industrialized countries for quite a long time, any attempt at unlimited intervention
to bring the foreign exchange rate back to something akin to a fixed exchange rate
regime would be a grand experiment.
C. Monetary Policy and Balance Sheet Erosion
On the subject of further monetary easing through the purchase of long-term 
government bonds, Professor Meltzer and I disagree on the implications it would
have with respect to erosion of the central bank’s balance sheet. 
And, as both gentlemen say, and as I mentioned in my paper, it would probably
not be a significant problem if one could consider the issue by integrating the govern-
ment with the central bank. Such an amalgamation approach is perhaps valid, and
the real issue is the introduction of a drug into the fiscal area, namely, the central
bank’s purchase of long-term government bonds.
However, the assumption of integrated government disregards reality. Economists
can discuss issues by setting various assumptions in their models and this is one of
their strengths, but erosion of the central bank’s balance sheet cannot be solved just
by assuming an integrated government or the government’s obligation to stand
behind the BOJ.
1 This is because, in the real world, the Japanese government and the
BOJ are independent organizations and, since a clause whereby the government was
obliged to compensate for large losses in excess of its own capital incurred by the BOJ
was deleted in drafting the current Bank of Japan Law, balance sheet erosion could
well be a high hurdle for the BOJ.
In connection with this point, I would like to present my views explaining why 
I cannot agree with some of Professor Meltzer’s proposals.
First, is whether there is a possibility that the BOJ’s balance sheet would 
be eroded. Professor Meltzer argued that “There is little reason to believe that 
restoration of noninflationary growth would raise interest rates enough to impair the
Bank’s solvency.” In this regard, let us make a simple numerical exercise. 
Based on quite a naive monetary approach, suppose that the BOJ, with the aim 
of seeing the yen depreciate by some 10 percent, increases Japan’s M2+CDs by 
10 percent through the purchase of long-term government bonds. Although credit
expansion through lending is now quite limited in Japan, given the current money
supply of ¥600 trillion the BOJ could increase money supply by 10 percent if it 
purchased some ¥60 trillion worth of 10-year government bonds (yielding 1 percent)
held by nonfinancial institutions. If it did this and the economy witnessed inflation
or succeeded in restoring noninflationary growth with long-term interest rates of 
5 percent, the same level as in 1992 after the bursting of the bubble (at that time, the
1. Professor Meltzer argued, “I see no reason to believe there would be any doubt about the government’s obligation
to stand behind the Bank. No central bank has ever faced default, and no responsible government would permit
that to happen.” However, for example, there was a case in 1993 when the Central Bank of the Philippines 
faced financial difficulties due mainly to capital losses and a new central bank (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) 
was established.197
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growth rate of GDP was 1 percent and that of CPI was 1.6 percent), the BOJ would
incur a loss of about ¥18 trillion.
2 Since this amount is several times larger than its
net worth, the BOJ would thus see a substantial excess of liabilities, while the effects
on the noninflationary growth and foreign exchange rate would be quite uncertain.
Second, Professor Meltzer says, “Both the Japanese and U.S. governments have
current and prospective future liabilities far in excess of their assets. Yet, the public
regards U.S. or Japanese government securities as two of the safest assets in the
world.” As a Japanese, I am tempted to believe that our government bonds are
regarded as such, but I have to admit I am not convinced for the following reason.
Looking at the general government
3 balance sheet in the National Accounts
Statistics as of the end of 1997, the Japanese government’s assets were far in excess of
liabilities, by ¥428 trillion in fact. However, recent studies show that the government
carries huge off-balance sheet liabilities, such as pension liabilities, which far exceed
this amount, thereby casting doubt on the reliability of official statistics. Under such
circumstances, the rating of Japanese government bonds has unfortunately been
declining and there are some who even warn of fiscal collapse. Putting all this
together, it is natural to think that if the government can compile its balance 
sheet precisely like that of the central bank, the rating of government bonds would
fluctuate according to the amount of excess liabilities.
Thus, it is far from convincing that erosion of the BOJ’s balance sheet as 
specifically shown in the numerical exercise above would not impair the credibility 
of the BOJ or the Japanese government.
Professor Meltzer concluded his comments by saying, “The Bank should put its
fears and concerns aside. Monetary expansion to end deflation is desirable for Japan,
Asia, and the rest of the world. It is a mistake to let concerns about short-term costs,
such as temporary currency depreciation, delay longer-term benefits by continuing
the deflationary policy of recent years. And this is especially true since the costs are
less than the costs of continued recession and deflation.” 
Unfortunately, his comments are not likely to convince the BOJ that it can “put
its fears and concerns aside.” To indulge in the drug-inducing purchase of long-term
government bonds would inevitably be accompanied by long-term costs. In addition,
“temporary currency depreciation” is not a cost to begin with if it is necessary 
for the world economy. When we read Professor Meltzer’s comments, we get 
the impression that he is suggesting the BOJ should “jump in before looking” based
on a monetarist’s belief.
2. This numerical exercise assumes that time-to-maturity of the Japanese government bonds stays at 10 years. If we
take account of the time lag until long-term interest rates increase, the capital loss will vary as follows: ¥17 trillion
when the time-to-maturity is nine years, and ¥16 trillion when it is eight years.
3. Following the definition in the National Accounts Statistics, general government refers to the sum of central 
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